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Andrew Koppelman
Bad News for Everybody: Lawson and Kopel on Health Care Reform and Originalism

Introduction
Gary Lawson & David Kopel’s Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate 1 purports to reply to my essay defending the
constitutionality of the health care mandate. 2 Surprisingly, however, most of my claims, about
the scope of the commerce and taxing powers, attract little of their attention. 3 And even with
respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is the focus of their essay, they do not
defend—or even mention—the principal target of my attack: the reasoning of the federal district
courts that have agreed with them that the mandate is unconstitutional.
The really big surprise is their account of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Relying on a
new book coauthored by Lawson, The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 4 they argue
that the Clause incorporates norms from eighteenth-century agency law, administrative law, and
corporate law, and that the mandate (and perhaps much else in the U.S. Code, though they are
coy about this 5) violates those norms. The book is a valuable contribution, an original and
enlightening exploration of the contemporaneous meaning of the clause. The book is, however,
careful to take no position on how the Clause should be interpreted today. 6 Bad News for
Professor Koppelman is bolder. It is, to my knowledge, the first modern piece that has ever

1

Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/11/08/lawson&kopel.html.
2
Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health
Care
Reform,
121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/
2011/04/26/koppelman.html.
3
They do challenge those claims briefly in explaining that “lack of space” prevents a fuller
rebuttal. Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 268 n.8.
4
GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS
OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010) [hereinafter ORIGINS].
5
See infra notes 23 - 25, 48-49 and accompanying text.
6
See Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P. Miller, Robert G. Natelson & Guy I. Seidman, Raiders of the
Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 1, 8-9.
1

proposed that these eighteenth-century norms become the master concepts for determining the
scope of congressional power today. 7
Because what they offer is new news, it seems harsh to reproach me for not taking the
limits they offer into account in my own consideration of congressional power. How could I have
known? Nor am I alone in my innocence. For nearly 200 years, the federal government has taken
on ever larger responsibilities without reference to these limits, which had been forgotten. From
now on, Lawson and Kopel tell us, everything will have to be different. Any question of
congressional power must ignore all of this history, and be resolved solely with reference to
“careful study of the Clause’s origin, purpose, and meaning.” 8
The Necessary and Proper Clause, as they understand it, tightly limits the scope of
implied powers. Their logic implies the greatest revolution in federal power in American history.
(And as I shall shortly explain, this would decidedly be a revolution from above.) The stakes go
way, way beyond health care reform. Lawson and Kopel do not merely want to burn the house to
roast the pig. They are ready to torch the whole city.
I. The New (Original) Necessary and Proper Clause
Lawson and Kopel raise two constitutional objections to the mandate. First, “a law
enacted under the clause must exercise a subsidiary rather than an independent power.” 9 The
mandate does not satisfy this requirement, because “the power to order someone to purchase a
product is not a power subordinate or inferior to other powers.” 10 Second, an exercise of power
must treat citizens impartially, “with an eye towards the interests of all affected persons.” 11 This
requirement is violated by a mandate that requires people to buy insurance “in order to subsidize
other people.” 12 These are, they acknowledge, unfamiliar rules of law, “perhaps strangesounding to modern ears. 13 I will consider each in turn.
A. Worthy and Dignified
The first of the requirements is puzzling. An incident must be “a thing necessarily
depending upon, appertaining to, or following another thing that is more worthy or principal.” 14
How are we to tell if one power is as “worthy” or “dignified” as another? To return to a case I

7

The proposal is suggested, with little elaboration, in a few passages in Robert G. Natelson, The
Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV.
243 (2004).
8
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 268-70.
9
Id. at 270.
10
Id. at 271.
11
Id. at 288.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 270.
14
Id. at 273 (quoting GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (London, Strahan et al., 10th ed.
1782)).
2

focused on in my first essay, 15 how are we to know that the power to jail those who rob the mails
is “less important or less valuable” 16 than the enumerated power to operate a post office? 17
These terms may have made sense in the eighteenth century. “By the founding era, the
jurisprudence of principals and incidents had become a prominent and well-developed branch of
the law. Numerous cases had specified which lesser interests were incident to which greater
interests.” 18 But it is not obvious how to translate these terms from their then-familiar
applications in property law or the law of corporations to the very different context of
governmental powers. Marshall tried to do it in McCulloch v. Maryland. 19 So did others at the
time who struggled with the question presented there: whether Congress had the power to charter
a bank. 20 Lawson and Kopel are right that I paid no attention to these discussions. The reason
was that these terms are no part of modern constitutional doctrine: as they concede, “[m]ore
recent cases no longer use the language of principals and incidents.” 21 Since the lower courts to
which I was responding have claimed that the mandate was unconstitutional under existing law, I
thought that my task was to justify the mandate under that law.
These terms take us into terra incognita. The debates at the time of McCulloch show that
even then, there was deep uncertainty about how to apply the doctrine of principals and incidents
to Article I of the Constitution. 22 It is even harder to know how to apply them today. And what
would be the consequence if we did?
All we are told is that the holdings of more recent cases—meaning, cases decided in the
last century—“are broadly consistent with that framework,” 23 and that sustaining the
constitutional objection to the individual mandate “does not require overruling any decision.” 24
They add that “one could fairly argue that those decisions misapplied the original meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, but those arguments would involve issues not raised here.” 25 It is,
in short, an open question how much of existing law would have to be scrapped if this worthand-dignity rule were adopted by the courts.
15

Koppelman, supra note 2, at 5, 8, 9.
Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra
note 4, at 52, 61.
17
Lawson and Kopel respond to this difficulty by arguing that, under a 1711 English statute, “the
power to ‘establish’ a post office seems directly to have included the power to define and punish
crimes against the post office.” Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 278 n.42. But the only
evidence they offer for this proposition is the title of the English statute, “An Act for
Establishing a General Post Office,” the substance of which extends to defining crimes against
the post office. It will take more than one statute’s casual use of a label to establish that the
shared semantic meaning of “post office,” evident to any reasonable person in the eighteenth
century, included the apparatus of criminal justice.
18
Natelson, supra note 16, at 62.
19
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-21 (1819).
20
See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 84, 114-19.
21
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 283.
22
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
23
Id. They do, however, express doubt that the federal government has any power to regulate the
insurance industry. Id. at 271 n.14.
24
Id. at 284 n.66.
25
Id. at 283.
16
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What is not uncertain is that the federal government now exercises unenumerated powers
that are not obviously lesser to the enumerated ones. The enumerated power “to establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization” 26 seems no more “dignified” 27 than Congress’s plenary
authority to regulate immigration and exclude aliens. 28 Perhaps what they say about the mandate
is also true of control over the borders: this “is an extraordinary power of independent
significance . . . that would be enumerated as a principal power if it were granted at all to the
federal government.” 29 Congress regulates air and water pollution under the Clean Air Act 30 and
the Clean Water Act, 31 which is “not a ‘less worthy’ or less substantial power than the power to
regulate commerce.” 32 Nor is the power to regulate intrastate railway rates that have “a close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate service, and to the
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair
terms.” 33 Nor is the power to ban racial discrimination in places of public accommodation that
serve interstate travelers or that sell products shipped across state lines 34: the Civil Rights Act of
1964 may be in trouble. 35 Nor is the power to regulate the sale of adulterated food: the Pure Food
and Drug Act may also have to go. 36 Nor is the sale of securities, which typically is not
conducted across state lines: so much for the Securities and Exchange Commission. 37 Nor is
banking: out goes the Federal Reserve. 38 Congress has the enumerated power to “coin Money,”39
but the power to print paper money is not obviously inferior or subordinate to this, and Madison
denounced any such power at the end of Federalist 10. 40
B. Fiduciary Duties
Exercises of power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, they argue, must conform to
the fiduciary obligation “to treat all principals with presumptive equality when there is more than
one principal.” 41 The mandate violates this: “The purpose of the individual mandate is to force
26

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 279.
28
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888); Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
29
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 280.
30
42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
31
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
32
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 280.
33
Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
34
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
35
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
36
Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768.
37
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
38
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
40
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at X (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). As has Lawson.
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23,
33 (1994).
41
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 288.
27
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people who choose not to buy a particular type of insurance from government-favored
oligopolists to buy the unwanted product in order to subsidize other people.” 42
Note the peculiar formulation in the cumbersomely constructed sentence just quoted,
which uses the preposition “to” twice to refer to two different infinitive verbs, 43 thus stating the
Act’s purpose ambiguously. Which of these do they take to be the purpose: to force people to
buy, or to subsidize health care consumers who would lose out in an unregulated market? It is a
silly question, of course. The answer is, both. However, it is clear (and the sentence implicitly
acknowledges) which is the end and which is the means. The reason for the mandate, its
instrumental purpose, is to spread the cost of insuring those with preexisting conditions who
would be unable to buy insurance absent the regulatory scheme. 44 If the latter is the fundamental
purpose of the law, then it is hardly clear that Congress has not acted “with an eye towards the
interests of all affected persons.” 45 Congress is trying to make sure that everyone equally has
access to adequate and affordable health care. Lawson and Kopel have not explained why that is
not “to treat them all fairly.” 46 Indeed, it is arguable that Congress violated its fiduciary
obligations by allowing the health care issue to fester, and millions to go uninsured, for decades
before it finally addressed it.
Maybe Lawson and Kopel understand the impartiality requirement more radically than
this, to require not just that government act for impartial reasons, but that any laws that it enacts
does not benefit or harm any distinct class of citizens. There may not be “political favorites.” 47
But all laws classify and create winners and losers. If that is what is forbidden, then all laws
would be, at least presumptively, unconstitutional. 48 How that presumption of anarchy could be
rebutted, and what the new “general federal ‘equal protection’ doctrine that extends far beyond
the specific case of the individual mandate” 49 would entail, is something that Lawson is not yet
ready to tell us. Until he does, the claim that the mandate violates this rule is too cryptic to
answer.
II. A Larger Agenda
I said at the outset that their “reply” may not really be a reply. They implicitly concede
my central claim, that the mandate is plainly legitimate under the Necessary and Proper Clause
as it has been understood in the United States for more than half a century. The judicial opinions
declaring the mandate unconstitutional were transparently dishonest in claiming that their
approach was required by (or even consistent with) settled precedent concerning the scope of

42

Id.
Actually it contains four infinitive verbs, but “to force” and “to subsidize” are the two
plausible candidates for the statute’s purpose.
44
The mandate is an eminently rational means to that end. See Koppelman, supra note 2, at 2,
14-18.
45
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 288.
46
Natelson, supra note 16, at 59.
47
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 291.
48
The anarchical tendencies of Lawson’s suspicion of law are noted in Larry Alexander, Proving
the Law: Not Proven, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 905 (1992).
49
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 1, at 291 n.94.
43
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congressional power. 50 Lawson and Kopel properly treat those arguments as beneath their notice.
Conformity with precedent is no part of their project.
The rules that Lawson and Kopel’s originalist research claims to have uncovered, 51 if
implemented, would seem to accomplish just what I have said that other arguments against the
mandate would do: “randomly blow up large parts of the U.S. Code.” 52 But this cannot be said of
Lawson and Kopel. It rather appears that they would deliberately blow up large parts of the U.S.
Code.
Why would one think that the destruction of so much existing American law is
appropriate? It would obviously be silly to claim that settled law is untouchable, but is it not
equally obvious that it should not be trashed whenever new archival research casts doubt on its
originalist credentials?
Of the two authors, Lawson is the one with the most thoroughly worked out interpretive
theory, so I will focus on his other work for an answer. 53 The most prominent scholars who
claim that the mandate is unconstitutional are all hunting for bigger game; all have long sought a
revolution in federal power. 54 Lawson, one of our most sophisticated constitutional theorists, is
no exception. But even within this crowd, his well-matured constitutional theory incorporates an
unusual degree of recklessness.
Lawson is untroubled by the wholesale overruling of precedent, because he does not
think that precedent is part of the Constitution and thinks that it is indeed unconstitutional to give
it any weight at all. 55 He is also confident that “the post-New Deal administrative state is
unconstitutional.” 56 The elimination of all federal regulation of the complex American economy
might, of course, devastate the lives of millions of people, turning American life into a nightmare
of pollution, consumer fraud, contaminated food and drink, and rampant racial discrimination. A
judicial decision that U.S. paper money is worthless would throw the whole world economy into
depression, possibly precipitating famines and wars. Other opponents of the health care law, such
as Randy Barnett and Richard Epstein, 57 who want to dismantle the modern administrative state,
50

See Koppelman, supra note 2, at 7-9.
Not being a historian, I cannot judge the accuracy of those claims, but I have no reason to
doubt them. The authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause are all respected
and careful scholars.
52
Koppelman, supra note 2, at 11.
53
Kopel may not agree with Lawson’s larger project, so the critique in Part II is addressed
exclusively to Lawson. Lawson and Kopel’s argument stands on its own, and the argument of
Part I supra recognizing its radical implications does not, in any way, rely on Lawson’s prior
work. That said, my claim is reinforced by evidence that those implications are intended. When
you, the reader, evaluate their interpretation of the Constitution, I think it is relevant (this is one
of my methodological differences with Lawson, see infra notes 59 - 62 and accompanying text)
that the judicial adoption of that interpretation would harm you and your family.
54
Koppelman, supra note 2, at 18-23.
55
Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 1 (2007); Lawson, supra note 40.
56
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231
(1994).
57
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
(2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT
51

6

are naively optimistic about the results that will follow from its demolition. Lawson just does not
care. He is prepared “to hold fast to the Constitution though the heavens may fall.” 58 In
interpreting the Constitution, he has warned, we must not “contaminate the interpretative inquiry
with concerns about real-world decisionmaking.” 59
Lawson thinks that constitutional interpretation must never be contaminated by such
nontextual considerations—that, in fact, any mode of reasoning that does take consequences into
account is not entitled to be called interpretation. 60 Rather, it is “self-evident” 61 that interpreters
must read constitutional texts in isolation from their effects. It makes no difference whether we
are reading the Confederate constitution or the one that governs the United States today. 62
It would be silly to wrestle with him 63 over who gets to use the term “interpretation,” but
I will note that the public meaning of the term in contemporary America refers to the practice of
parsing the Constitution as it is in fact done by the federal courts. American constitutional
interpretation—like it or not, that is the label that the natives around here attach to the practice—
does not rely exclusively on original intention or meaning. Philip Bobbitt has shown that
American constitutional argument also draws upon on precedent, inferences from the overall
structure of the government that has been established, prudence, and the court’s sense of the
national ethos. Constitutional arguments aim to draw all of these together into coherent accounts
of constitutional meaning. 64 Because we must live with the results, our deepest collective
TO HEALTH CARE?

(1997); Randy E. Barnett, The Case for a Federalism Amendment, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044199838345461.html; Richard A.
Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill Is
Unconstitutional,
POINT
OF
LAW
(Dec.
18,
2009),
http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/impermissible-ratemaking-in-he.php.
58
Lawson, supra note 56, at 1249. His views on this question are somewhat unclear, however.
Elsewhere he suggests that it may be impossible to show that the Constitution has authority in
the contemporary United States. Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural Imperative
(or “Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 381 (2003) [hereinafter Lawson,
Interpretive Equality]; Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J.
1823, 1835-36 (1997) [hereinafter Lawson, On Reading Recipes]. Evidently he doubts the
Constitution’s authority but is prepared to invoke it whenever it would help defeat any assertion
of state power.
59
GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 9 (2004).
60
See generally Lawson, Reading Recipes, supra note 58.
61
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 59, at 9.
62
Id.
63
He is ready to wrestle. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 78 n.79 (2006).
64
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). Bobbitt
denies that there is any algorithm for constitutional interpretation but defends the consequent
indeterminacy on the basis that it “gives us a way to measure a possible legal world against our
sense of rightness, going back and forth between a proposed interpretation and its world, and
ourselves.” PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 158 (1991). Robert Tsai has
shown that constitutional law is even more indeterminate than Bobbitt allows, inasmuch as it has
been significantly shaped by rhetorical moves that do not fit into any of Bobbitt’s modalities. See
7

aspirations also inevitably influence the interpretive inquiry. 65 We don’t read the Constitution we
have to live with the way we read the Confederate one.
The real originalist question is one of original purpose at different levels of abstraction.
The commerce power has been stretched beyond anything specifically intended by the framers.
But the framers also had a more abstract intention: in Robert Stern’s words, “that no hiatus
between the powers of the state and federal governments to control commerce was intended to
exist,” 66 and that the people of the United States should not “be entirely unable to help
themselves through any existing social or governmental agency.” 67 It is like the old question
whether the general purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment—to mandate the legal equality of
blacks—should trump the framers’ specific intention to permit school segregation and
miscegenation laws. 68 The general purpose of the Constitution, the overriding reason why the
Articles of Confederation were abandoned, a reason known by every reasonable interpreter of the
document at the time, was that the country was facing pressing national problems that no one
state could solve. 69 That is why it is a legitimate move in constitutional argumentation to dismiss
an argument for constraints on congressional power, even constraints that some framers may
specifically have had in mind, as “so pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to
discard it.” 70 Lawson and Kopel’s originalism is not the only possible originalism. 71 What is
fundamentally perverse about their reading of the Clause is that it reproduces the situation that
the Constitution was an attempt to overcome. 72
ROBERT TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 31-32
(2008).
65
JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD
(2011).
66
Robert L. Stern, The Commerce That Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1365 (1943).
67
Id. at 1335.
68
See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 117–33, 161–63 (1977); Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966).
69
In the terms that one of Lawson’s coauthors proposes, one might reasonably think that the
power to solve problems that the states are separately incompetent to address is an “incidental
power to undertake acts not within a strict construction but within the scope presumptively
intended by the parties.” Natelson, supra note 16, at 67.
70
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819).
71
Originalism is now a large cluster of very different theories. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J.
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239 (2008). Jack Rakove’s warning is pertinent here:
With its pressing ambition to find determinate meanings at a fixed moment, the
strict theory of orginalism cannot capture everything that was dynamic and
creative, and thus uncertain and problematic, in the constitutional experiments of
the Revolutionary era . . . . Where we look for precise answers, the framers and
ratifiers were still struggling with complex and novel questions whose perplexities
did not disappear in 1788.
JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
10 (1996).
72
Robert Bennett has noted Lawson’s tendency to implicitly ascribe nonobvious traits to his
hypothetical appropriate decipherer of constitutional meaning. Robert Bennett, Originalism and
8

III. “Originalism” as a Rationalization for Oligarchy
There is also a question of democratic legitimacy. The mandate was enacted by Congress
after a big, public political fight. Lawson and Kopel propose to override this and to have the
federal courts strike it down, in the name of a highly contestable conception of the Constitution.
Lawson, a former Reagan Administration official, is frustrated that Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush never even opposed legislation on the grounds that it exceeded
Congress’s enumerated powers and certainly never tried to dismantle the modern regulatory
state. 73 They did not do it because they knew it would be politically disastrous. Voters do not
like poisoned food, air, and water.
The solution, then, is to do it through the courts: to impose—in the name of an admittedly
fictitious, We the People of the United States 74—results that most of the actual population of the
United States would hate. To Lawson, it does not matter what the people think. A small elite of
enlightened ones, drawing on specialized knowledge, will bring us a higher form of democracy
that reflects the people’s deepest interests, and they will do it by seizing centralized power.
But of course, we need to put originalist scholarship in context.75 Lawson may be ready
to dismantle the entire modern administrative state, but—as he often cheerfully admits 76—that is
not going to happen. His work is, however, likely to be right handy for political actors inclined to
be more selective. A revealing text here is a footnote from Justice Clarence Thomas’s
concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 77 which advocated a restriction of federal power much
like Lawson and Kopel advocate, but with this proviso:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize
that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental
reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance
interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean. 78
Thomas’s deference to precedent is only partial, however. He is still prepared to use originalism
to trash those aspects of existing practice that he is satisfied that the country can do without. 79
the Living Constitution, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 107 (2011). The inclination to privilege specific over general purposes
is one of those nonobvious traits.
73
Lawson, supra note 56, at 1237.
74
See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 63, at 59-61.
75
For another, related attempt to do this, see Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the
Establishment Clause, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 749-50 (2009).
76
See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 56, at 1236; Lawson, supra note 40, at 33.
77
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
78
Id. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (admitting to being a selectively “faint-hearted originalist”).
79
Thus, for example, he recently declared “my view that the Establishment Clause restrains only
the Federal government, and that, even if incorporated, the Clause only prohibits ‘actual legal
coercion.’” Utah Highway Patrol Assn. v. American Atheists, 565 U.S. __, __ (2011)(Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of cert.), quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring). This would destroy at a stroke a large doctrinal structure of
9

There is a sense in which Thomas is more moderate than Lawson: a proposal to shoot everyone
is more extreme than a proposal to shoot only those whom some central decisionmaker decides
to liquidate. On the other hand, Thomas’s modification of Lawsonian originalism transforms it
from an exotic and weird philosophy of governance into one that is depressingly familiar: a little
group of oligarchs get to govern everyone else. 80 Lawson seems a charming, mostly harmless 81
crank because his proposals are so unreal. In the hands of Thomas, however, originalism loses its
harmlessness and thus its charm.
Conclusion: Bad News for Everybody
If we read the Constitution as Lawson and Kopel propose, then historical research of the
kind that they have been doing becomes a lever that can move the world. New evidence of the
original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause shows that American law misconstrues that
meaning. So much the worse for American law. The rest of us, if we believe in the rule of law,
are obligated to upend our lives and adapt to the new marching orders that emerge from the
archives, at least until the next round of research yanks us off in another direction. 82 This would
be an insane way to run a civilization. It is bad news for everybody.

Andrew Koppelman is John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political
Science at Northwestern University and a former Senior Editor of The Yale Law Journal. He
gives thanks to Bob Bennett, Arpit Garg, David Kopel, Gary Lawson, Simon Lazarus, Steve
Constitutional restraints on state imposition of religion, such as the prohibition of official prayer
in schools.
80
See JEFFREY WINTERS, OLIGARCHY (2011).
81
He is not altogether harmless, because his scholarship has influenced Supreme Court
decisionmaking. See, for example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997), citing Gary
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
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